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Abstract Theoretical analyses of international environmental agreements (IEAs) have
often employed the concept of self-enforcing agreements to predict the number of parties to
such an agreement. The term self-enforcing, however, is a bit misleading. The concept refers
to the stability of cooperative agreements, not to enforcing compliance with these agreements
once they are in place. In this paper we analyze an IEA game in which parties to an agreement
finance an independent monitor who audits the compliance performance of the members of
an agreement. These audits reveal instances of noncompliance so they can be sanctioned.
We find that costly monitoring of compliance limits the circumstances under which interna-
tional cooperation to protect the environment is worthwhile, but when IEAs do form they will
often involve greater participation than IEAs that do not require costly monitoring. Conse-
quently, costly monitoring of IEAs can produce higher international environmental quality.
Moreover, under certain conditions, aggregate welfare is higher when IEAs require costly
monitoring.
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1 Introduction
International environmental agreements (IEAs) made between sovereign nations seeking to
manage shared environmental and natural resources are susceptible to two sources of free rid-
ing. First, because participation with IEAs is voluntary, countries can decide at will whether
to become a party to an agreement. If an IEA only requires a subset of countries to join
before entering into force, as is typically the case, incentives exist for some countries to
stay out of the agreement and free ride off the provision of the cooperating others. Second,
if compliance with the terms of the agreement is not properly enforced, parties to an IEA
will have an incentive to violate the terms of the agreement and free ride off those countries
that do comply. Previous theoretical analyses of IEAs have focused on the impact the first
form of free riding has on the effectiveness of IEAs, while avoiding altogether the possibility
that member countries may not fully comply with their commitments. In this paper, we deal
directly with the issue of noncompliance within IEAs by constructing and analyzing a game
in which parties to an IEA finance an independent monitor who audits, with some endogenous
probability, the compliance performance of individual members.
All effective international agreements must include costly compliance monitoring.1 For
example, the Implementation Committee of the Montreal Protocol is responsible for gath-
ering compliance information about countries that are suspected to be in violation of the
Protocol (Benedick 1998).2 Likewise, the Compliance Committee, one of the institutions
constructed to enforce compliance with the Kyoto Protocol, is designed to monitor the com-
pliance behavior of signatory countries and then report their findings to the Enforcement
Branch, which has the power to impose sanctions (UNFCC 2002). The Convention on Inter-
national Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) makes a similar provision for monitoring
for compliance through the Standing Committee, its own management body responsible for
enforcement.3 The enforcement provisions included in CITES and the Montreal and Kyoto
Protocols allow their respective management bodies to monitor a party’s behavior only when
it is suspected to be violating the treaty. In contrast, the International Whaling Commission,
the management body appointed under the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling, established the International Observers Scheme to monitor signatories’ behavior.
This policy required member countries to each appoint observers and finance monitoring
activities on a rotating basis.4 Although the design of monitoring and enforcement institu-
tions differ across international agreements, each share the common characteristic that the
cost of monitoring activities must be bourn by the parties themselves.
Despite the fact that costly monitoring for compliance must be part of any international
agreement, theoretical analyses of IEAs usually assume that compliance can be enforced
without cost. In the literature IEAs are often analyzed using the equilibrium concept of a
self-enforcing agreement.5 A self-enforcing agreement made between agents is defined as
a single coalition of cooperating agents from which no member of the coalition wishes to
1 This point is argued by Heister et al. (1997) who provide a qualitative analysis of why international envi-
ronmental agreements need to be enforced and the available strategies for enforcing compliance.
2 Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Montreal, September 1987; Amended 1990, 1992, 
1995, 1997, 1999.
3 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, Washington, March 1973; Amended 1979.
4 The International Observers Scheme was in effect from 1972 until the moratorium on whaling was imposed 
in 1982 (Oberthur 1998).
5 Other stability concepts have been employed in the analysis of IEAs, including ‘core’ solutions from coop-
erative game theory (Chandler and Tulkens 1995, 1997), renegotiation-proof equilibria (Barrett 1994; Finus 
and Rundshagen 1998) and farsighted stability in the context of repeated games (Osmani and Tol 2007).
withdraw (the coalition is internally stable) and no non-member wishes to join (the coalition
is externally stable).6 This definition of coalitional stability was first proposed by D’Aspre-
mont et al. (1983) for their analysis of cartel stability. Barrett (1994) appears to have been the
first to apply it to the analysis of international environmental relations. However, the term
self-enforcing is a bit misleading, because it does not address the problem of enforcing the
compliance of the members of a cooperative agreement. Most authors who use this equi-
librium concept simply assume that parties to a self-enforcing IEA comply fully with the
terms of the agreement (e.g. Hoel 1992; Carraro and Siniscalco 1993, 1998; Barrett 1994,
2003; Kolstad 2007).7 Barrett (1994) and Finus and Rundshagen (1998) have examined
enforcement mechanisms for IEAs. They focus on renegotiation-proof punishment strate-
gies with which parties to an agreement sanction violators by jointly reducing their provision
of international environmental quality in the future.
We take a different approach to the study of compliance and enforcement of IEAs that is
motivated by the costly monitoring activities that are part of established international agree-
ments. We maintain the concept of a self-enforcing agreement to determine the equilibrium
number of parties to an IEA. However, to counteract the incentive that parties have to vio-
late the terms of an IEA, they finance and empower an independent body with the power
to monitor their compliance behavior. Parties to an IEA that are monitored and deemed in
violation of the agreement incur a costly sanction. We consider two types of sanctions—one
in which an enforcement body imposes a financial sanction on detected violations, and the
other in which detected violators, as well as those who choose not to participate in an IEA,
face a costly deterioration of their reputation as cooperative members of the international
community.8
Our efforts yield several new results. First, the range of international environmental prob-
lems within which a welfare-improving self-enforcing IEA can form is smaller when monitor-
ing is necessary and costly. This follows because monitoring increases the cost of cooperation,
which in turn limits the set of situations under which a treaty can actually increase interna-
tional welfare. Second, when an IEA is expected to form, it will often have more members
6 Models of self-enforcing IEAs have included provisions for trade sanctions (Barrett 1997a,b), side payments
(Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Carraro and Botteon 1997; Hoel and Schneider 1997), issue linkage (Folmer
et al. 1993; Carraro and Siniscalco 1997; Botteon and Carraro 1998) and minimum participation requirements
(Barrett 1998a, 2003; Carraro et al. 2003). For a review of many of these extensions see Wagner (2001).
7 There is ample evidence that many existing IEAs experience significant problems with noncompliance.
For example, CITES has witnessed hundreds of infractions every year since its inception in 1979 (Carraro
and Siniscalco 1999; Finus 2004). Similarly, customs officers throughout the world frequently intercept flows
of CFC products even though these substances have been banned under the Montreal Protocol since 1991
(Finus 2004). Although the performance of the Kyoto Protocol cannot formally be evaluated until the end
of the first commitment period (2008–2012), many countries are currently on pace to significantly exceed
their quotas (Friends of the Earth 2006). Although it is universally accepted that some level of noncompliance
with IEAs exists, there remains debate as to the magnitude and consequences of noncompliance. On one side
of the debate, Chayes and Chayes (1991) argue that high levels of compliance are often observed in IEAs
without formal enforcement mechanisms and therefore enforcement is not a real concern. However, Downs
et al. (1996) argue that high levels of compliance may result because the lack of enforcement motivates parties
to form shallow agreements to begin with.
8 Because our model is one of enforcing compliance within stable coalitions it is related to the vast literature
on the economics of law enforcement. For a review of this literature see Polinsky and Shavell (2000). There is
also a large literature on the economics of enforcing environmental policies. Recent contributions on enforc-
ing emissions standards, tradable emissions permits, and emissions taxes include Arguedas (2007), Stranlund
(2007), and Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006), respectively. The fundamental difference between our
work and the law enforcement literature is that we examine enforcement within a model of endogenous coa-
lition formation while the typical model of enforcement involves a government enforcing a rule that it has
imposed.
when the parties must pay for compliance monitoring. This occurs because the additional cost
of being a party to an IEA must be offset with an increase in the level of environmental quality,
which is realized through an increase in the number of parties to the agreement. As a result,
costly monitoring of IEAs can produce higher environmental quality. In addition, provided
that the number of potential parties to an agreement is sufficiently large, social welfare can
be greater under an IEA that is costly to monitor. Finally, we find that our principal results are
accentuated when compliance monitoring is not perfectly accurate. That is, monitoring errors
further reduce the set of situations in which multilateral cooperation is welfare enhancing
and thus limit the opportunities for an IEA to form. However, when an agreement does form,
monitoring inaccuracy can generate higher participation and environmental quality.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. After presenting a basic model of a self-enforc-
ing IEA in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3 we extend the model to allow for noncompliance and assume that
parties to a self-enforcing IEA finance an independent monitor who checks on their compli-
ance choices and applies a financial sanction in cases of detected noncompliance. Section4
contains the principal results of our work. In this section we derive the consequences of costly
monitoring of IEAs on the value of international cooperation, the circumstances under which
a welfare-improving IEA will form, and the self-enforcing number of members of an IEA. In
Sect. 5 we analyze the effects of costly monitoring on global welfare. In Sect. 6 we consider
an alternative model in which IEA violators, as well as those who do not participate in the
agreement, suffer a costly loss in reputation. We conclude in Sect. 7.
2 The Basic Model of a Self-enforcing IEA
In this section, we present a standard model of a self-enforcing IEA—one that does not
require enforcement—to review the structure of these games and to provide a baseline for
determining the effects of costly compliance monitoring on the outcomes of these games.
For simplicity, throughout our analysis countries make a discrete choice whether to abate
their emissions. Although a model with continuous abatement choice would allow for more
general results, the discrete choice model has been adopted in a number of previous studies
because of its tractability. Thus, following Barrett (2003); Ulph (2004) and Kolstad (2007),
consider a situation where N identical countries each emit a uniformly mixed transboundary
pollutant. Country i’s welfare is
wi = A + b(qi + q−i ) − cqi , (1)
where qi is equal to one if i abates its emissions and zero if it does not, q−i is the sum of the 
abatement decisions made by all other countries, b is the constant benefit of abatement by i or 
any other country, c is the constant individual cost of abatement, and A is a positive constant. 
Assume that b < c so that no country will unilaterally abate its emissions, but that Nb  > c 
so that the countries’ joint welfare will be maximized when they all abate their emissions.
Recognizing the benefits from agreeing to control their emissions, countries have the 
incentive to form an IEA to do so. As in Ulph (2004) and Kolstad (2007), the formation 
of an IEA is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage, each country must decide 
independently whether to become a party to an IEA. Assume that countries have complete 
information regarding each others’ welfare functions and that they can form only a single 
cooperative coalition. In the second stage, all countries choose whether to abate their emis-
sions. Countries that become members of an IEA in the first stage commit to decisions in 
the second stage that maximize their joint welfare, given the decisions of the non-member 
nations. In this section we assume perfect compliance with the agreement so that members
of the IEA do not have to be monitored for compliance. While the parties to an IEA carry
through on their commitments to maximize their joint welfare in the second stage, non-
member countries maximize their individual welfare. Since the individual cost of abatement
outweighs the benefit for each country (i.e., b < c), all countries that are not members of an
IEA will decide to not abate their emissions in the second stage.
Given the decision of all non-member countries to not abate their emissions, the members
of an IEA will abate their emissions in the second stage as long as the coalition is profitable
in the sense that each member of the coalition is at least as well off as when all countries
choose not to control their emissions. Let s denote the number of parties to an IEA who all
agree to abate their emissions. Moreover, let w p(s) denote the welfare of each of the parties
to the IEA and let wnp(s) denote the welfare of each of the countries that are not party to
the agreement. Throughout the paper the superscript p signals that the country in question
is a party to an IEA, while the superscript np signals that the country is not a party to the
agreement. From (1) we have:
w p(s) = A + bs − c;
wnp(s) = A + bs. (2)
Since b < c, Nb > c, and w p(s) is increasing in s, there exist coalition sizes that are
strictly greater than one and weakly less than N that are profitable. The smallest of these
profitable coalitions is
sncmin = min
{
s|w p(s) ≥ wnp(0)} = min {s|s ≥ c/b}. (3)
Throughout, the superscript nc denotes values when the decisions of the members of an
IEA do not require costly monitoring (i.e., compliance is assumed perfect). If s ≥ sncmin from
the first stage of the game, the members of the coalition will agree to abate their emissions
in the second stage of the game. If s < sncmin, the members of the IEA maximize their joint
welfare by not abating their emissions in the second stage.
The subgame perfect equilibrium of the game is called a self-enforcing agreement in
the IEA literature. Intuitively, a self-enforcing agreement is one for which no party to the
agreement wants to leave the agreement and no non-party wishes to join. More formally:
Definition 1 An IEA consisting of s countries that comply with the agreement without the
need for costly monitoring is self-enforcing if and only if:
(i) w p(s) ≥ wnp(s − 1) for s > sncmin, or w p(sncmin) ≥ wnp(0) for s = sncmin
(i i) wnp(s) ≥ w p(s + 1). (4)
Requirement (i) is that the agreement is internally stable in the sense that no party has an
incentive to leave a self-enforcing agreement. Requirement (ii) is that the agreement is exter-
nally stable in the sense that no non-party wishes to join the IEA. The only internally stable
coalition is the one with s = sncmin members. To see why, note that for s > sncmin, (2) reveals that
w p(s) ≥ wnp(s − 1) implies b ≥ c, which violates our assumption that b < c. On the other
hand, an IEA with sncmin members is internally stable, because if one member of the coalition
defected then the remaining members would find it unprofitable to abate their emissions.
The defector’s welfare (as well as every other country’s welfare) would then be wnp(0),
which is weakly less than w p(sncmin). Finally, an IEA with s
nc
min members is also externally sta-
ble. Using requirement (ii) and the welfare functions (2), wnp(sncmin) ≥ w p(sncmin + 1) implies
b ≤ c, which is satisfied because b < c. Since an agreement consisting of sncmin members is the
only internally and externally stable coalition size, it is the equilibrium number of members
of a self-enforcing IEA.
Proposition 1 Let the equilibrium number of members of a self-enforcing agreement that
does not require costly monitoring be snc. Then, snc is the smallest profitable coalition; that
is,
snc = sncmin = min {s|s ≥ c/b}. (5)
The equilibrium number of members of an IEA that does not require costly monitoring is 
unique, strictly greater than 1, and weakly less than N . Note that [5] indicates that participa-
tion with an IEA is increasing in the cost of abatement, c, and decreasing in the individual 
benefit of abatement, b. Thus, Barrett’s (1994, 2003) claim that international cooperation to 
protect the environment will be greatest when it is needed least is easily verified.
It is clear that the concept of a self-enforcing agreement applies to the stability of a coop-
erating coalition, not to the coalition members’ decisions to comply with the terms of the 
agreement once they have joined. Indeed, if countries are able to observe each others’ com-
pliance decisions perfectly and without cost, then a member country has no incentive to join 
an agreement and then violate its requirements. If it did so all the other participating nations 
would observe this violation and would realize that they would be worse off if they continued 
to abate their emissions. Thus, under perfect information a member of a self-enforcing IEA 
would not violate the terms of the agreement because this would cause the agreement to 
collapse.
In reality, however, nations are not able to observe the compliance behavior of others so 
easily. Under imperfect information about individual nations’ compliance behavior, a coun-
try may be motivated to join an agreement and then decide to violate its terms. If the other 
participating countries do not observe this act of noncompliance, they will not automatically 
respond by refusing to abate their emissions. The violator may then be able to escape the 
cost of compliance while enjoying the benefit of cooperation of those that continue to abate 
their emissions.
To demonstrate the incentive parties have to violate the terms of the IEA under imper-
fect information regarding compliance behavior, assume that a member of an IEA with s 
members can fail to abate its emissions without being detected. If the party chooses to be 
noncompliant and the other member countries continue to abate their emissions because they 
can not observe this violation, the violator’s payoff is wnp(s −1) = A+b(s −1). If it instead 
remained compliant its payoff is w p(s) = A + bs − c. Subtracting wnp(s − 1) from w p(s) 
yields b − c, which is negative by assumption indicating that member countries always have 
an incentive to violate an agreement as long as they believe that the other members are unable 
to observe their violation. However, with homogenous countries, each should expect that all 
the others will have the same motivation to violate an IEA as they do—if one member of an 
agreement has an incentive to violate an agreement, then all members do. Thus, under asym-
metric information about countries’ abatement decisions and without monitoring to check 
on these decisions, no self-enforcing agreement exists (except for the trivial case of s = 0). 
This motivates the implementation of a monitoring mechanism to check on the compliance 
decisions of the members of an IEA and a sanction to punish detected violators.
3 Self-enforcing IEAs when Compliance is Costly to Monitor
We now modify the basic model of a self-enforcing IEA to give its members the opportunity 
to decide whether to comply with the terms of their agreement. We assume that members 
cannot observe each other’s compliance decisions and, therefore, each of them has an incen-
tive to violate the requirements of the agreement in the absence of adequate monitoring. To
counteract this incentive the parties of an IEA finance an independent monitor who audits
their compliance decisions. A fixed sanction is applied when violations are detected.
As before the model is analyzed as a stage game, but now the game has four stages. The
first stage (membership stage) proceeds exactly as before; that is, each country chooses inde-
pendently whether to join the IEA. In the second stage (treaty stage), members of the IEA
jointly agree on whether to abate their emissions and, if they do agree to abate their emissions,
each of them is required to contribute funds to the independent monitor. If IEA members
jointly decide not to control their emissions in stage two, they do not fund the monitor, an
effective IEA does not form, and the game ends. (Throughout, we refer to an effective IEA as
one that actually leads to emissions control). If an effective IEA forms in stage two, all coun-
tries make their abatement decisions independently in stage three (abatement stage). Finally,
in the fourth stage (enforcement stage) the monitor randomly audits the abatement decisions
of member countries with the funding provided to it in the second stage, and a sanction is
applied when the monitor finds a violation. Since the treaty, abatement, and enforcement
stages are new with this study, we now describe them in detail. Because the game is solved
by backward induction, we start with the last stage.
3.1 Enforcement Stage
If the game reaches this stage, an IEA with s members has formed, each member has agreed
to abate their emissions, each member has contributed x dollars to fund the monitor, and
all countries have made their abatement decisions. In the enforcement stage, the monitor
randomly audits the abatement decisions of the IEA members with a probability that is an
increasing function of the amount of funding the members contribute. Each additional dollar
of funding allows the number of random audits to increase by α > 0; that is, α is the constant
marginal productivity of resources devoted to monitoring. If s parties to an agreement each
provide x to fund the monitor, then the number of random audits conducted is sxα, and the
probability that any party is audited is
π = sxα/s = xα (6)
We will demonstrate shortly that an effective IEA will involve a monitoring probability
in the half-closed interval (0, 1].
Monitoring of the countries’ compliance behavior, however, may be subject to a host
of possible errors, including errors due to erroneous or missing data, reporting errors, and
errors in evaluating available performance data. Given an audit, let ρ1 ∈ [0, 1) denote the
probability that a compliant country is judged to be noncompliant (a Type I error), and let
ρ2 ∈ [0, 1) denote the probability that a noncompliant country is judged to be compliant (a
Type II error).9 These probabilities are common knowledge.
In practice, there are a variety of ways noncompliant countries may be sanctioned. Much
of our analysis in this regard is motivated by the enforcement mechanism of the Kyoto Proto-
col established under the Marrakesh Accords. These established an enforcement body (called
the Compliance Committee) with the power to sanction noncompliant parties by reducing
their greenhouse gas emissions quota for the next commitment period. Therefore, we assume
that a party that is revealed to be noncompliant by the monitor incurs a known exogenous
sanction of f . Others have criticized the enforcement strategy of the Kyoto Protocol as being
non-credible (e.g. Barrett 2003), because a party to an IEA who decides not to abate its
9 See Kaplow and Shavell (1994) for the effects of monitoring inaccuracy in a standard model of optimal law
enforcement.
emissions could just as easily choose not to pay the sanction if its violation is discovered.
Moreover, a party that is found to be in violation of the requirements of an IEA could simply
leave the agreement.
In Sect. 6 we consider another type of sanction that cannot be avoided so easily. There is
strong agreement in the economic and political science literature that a party’s willingness
to jointly manage transnational resources has value beyond a single treaty (Keohane 1986;
Chayes and Chayes 1991; Simmons 1998; Barrett 2003). Complying with international agree-
ments builds a country’s reputation as a cooperating member of the international community,
and that reputation allows it to be a part of other beneficial agreements. Chayes and Chayes
(1991, p. 320) introduce the flip-side of this argument: “A reputation for unreliability cannot
be confined to the area of activity in which it is earned. It is inevitable that a state’s defection
from treaty rules will generate repercussions and linkages throughout the network of its rela-
tionships with others in the community. And these more diffuse responses can be calibrated
more finely than formal sanctions.” We would add that if failing to comply with an IEA
deteriorates a country’s reputation, then not participating with an agreement in first place
is also likely to be damaging. In Sect. 6 we model sanctions for agreement violations and
for non-participation as costly reputation effects, and show that our qualitative conclusions
about the impacts of costly monitoring on self-enforcing IEAs are largely preserved with this
approach.10
3.2 Abatement Stage
At this point in the game the members of an IEA have agreed to abate their emissions and
have funded the monitor. In the abatement stage both members of an IEA and non-mem-
bers independently choose whether to control their emissions. Since the individual cost of
abatement outweighs the individual benefit, each non-member will decide not to abate their
emissions in this stage. Member countries, however, make this decision by comparing the
expected cost of not complying with the agreement and the benefit of noncompliance.
Assume that the parties to an IEA are risk neutral and that they comply if they are at least
indifferent between compliance and noncompliance. Then, given an effective agreement con-
sisting of s parties, in the abatement stage an individual country will comply if its expected
welfare from doing so is not less than its expected welfare from noncompliance. Parties to
the agreement cannot observe the others’ compliance choices, so one party’s violation of its
commitment to abate its emissions will go unnoticed unless it is discovered by the monitor.
Given the probability of an audit π , the probabilities of Type I and Type II monitoring errors
ρ1 and ρ2, and the sanction f , it is straightforward to show that a party’s expected welfare
from compliance is w p(s) − x − πρ1 f , while its expected welfare from noncompliance
is wnp(s − 1) − x − π(1 − ρ2) f , where recall that w p(s) and wnp(s − 1) are defined by
(2). Note that πρ1 f is a compliant party’s expected sanction when it is falsely judged to be
noncompliant and π(1 − ρ1) f is a noncompliant party’s expected sanction from a correct
determination that it is noncompliant.11 A party to an IEA complies with the terms of the
10 A third possible form the sanction for noncompliance could take is a restriction on the ‘club’ benefits parties 
receive from belonging to an IEA. For example, the International Monetary Fund does not allow noncompliant 
members to access the pool of funds jointly provided by the signatories to the agreement (Chayes and Chayes 
1991). This arrangement is similar to posting a performance bond when ratifying an agreement, which is paid 
back to the party if they comply with the agreement.
11 One may wonder why a compliant country that is incorrectly determined to be noncompliant (Type I error) 
would passively accept the sanction. At the very least, a compliant country that faces a sanction for noncom-
pliance will attempt to prove that it has, in fact, satisfied the terms of the agreement. Under the Kyoto 
Protocol,
agreement if and only if
[w p(s) − x − πρ1 f ] − [wnp(s − 1) − x − π(1 − ρ2) f ]
= π f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2) − (c − b) ≥ 0 (7)
Clearly, π f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2) ≥ (c − b) is a necessary condition for an effective IEA. If this
condition did not hold, no party to an IEA would comply with its requirements and an effec-
tive agreement would not form. Note further that no amount of monitoring will be sufficient
to induce compliance if f (1−ρ1 −ρ2) < (c−b). This indicates that low sanctions or severe
monitoring errors can prevent the formation of an effective IEA. For the remainder of this
analysis we assume that f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2) ≥ (c − b) so that an effective IEA can form. Since
c > b, this condition clearly requires ρ1 + ρ2 < 1.
3.3 Treaty Stage
In this stage members of an IEA agree to abate their emissions and to fund the monitor
provided that these decisions maximize their joint welfare. Because we assume that each
country’s abatement decision is not directly observable by other countries, members of an
IEA cannot credibly commit to abatement. This, of course, is the reason for monitoring.
Each country that wishes to join an effective agreement is required to contribute funds to the
monitor. These payments are perfectly observed, so a country is not able to promise to make
the payment and then fail to do so.
Each party’s contribution to the monitor, x , is endogenous, so we determine this value
first. If an effective agreement is to form, each party would like to contribute as little as
possible while providing the monitor with sufficient resources to maintain compliance with
the agreement. This requires a payment x so that π f (1−ρ1 −ρ2)− (c−b) ≥ 0 binds. Since
π = xα from (6), the contribution to the monitor of an IEA that is required of all parties to
the agreement is
x = (c − b)/(α f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)). (8)
Note that this payment decreases with the size of the sanction, f , and the marginal produc-
tivity of resources devoted to monitoring, α, but is increasing in the probabilities the monitor
commits a Type I or Type II error, ρ1 and ρ2, and the gain from noncompliance, c − b. Note
further that π = xα = (c − b)/( f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)) is the equilibrium probability the monitor
audits any member of an effective IEA in the enforcement stage of the game. Our assumptions
that c > b, ρ1 + ρ2 < 1, and f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2) ≥ (c − b) guarantee that π ∈ (0, 1].
Parties to an IEA will fund the monitor and jointly agree to abate their emissions only
if they will be at least as well off as without an agreement. That is, again, abatement must
be profitable for the members of the agreement. Given s parties to an agreement that each
expects to earn w p(s) − x − πρ1 f = A + bs − c − x − πρ1 f if they abate their emissions,
and an individual country’s welfare in the absence of an IEA, A, the minimum size profitable
coalition is the smallest s such that A + bs − c − x −πρ1 f ≥ A. Substituting for x from (8)
and rearranging terms yields the smallest profitable coalition when an IEA requires costly
Footnote 11 continued
for example, if the enforcement branch of the Compliance Committee finds a party to be in violation, that party
is entitled to a hearing at which it can present additional evidence and expert testimony. Further, if a party is
still deemed noncompliant after the appeal process, it is given the chance to submit a final written testimony
to the enforcement branch (UNFCC 2002). This process appears to be designed to limit the probability of a
Type I error.
monitoring:
scmin = min
{
s|s ≥ c + πρ
1 f
b
+ c − b
bα f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)
}
. (9)
(The superscript ‘c’ is used to denote values when compliance with an IEA requires costly 
monitoring). If s ≥ scmin from the first stage of the game (the membership stage), the members 
of the coalition will agree to abate their emissions in the treaty stage of the game. Further-
more, each member pays x from (8) to the monitor in this stage and will comply with the 
terms of the agreement in stage three (the abatement stage). On the other hand, if s < scmin 
from the first stage, the members of the IEA maximize their joint welfare by not abating their 
emissions and not funding the monitor. Clearly, if s < scmin an effective IEA does not form 
and the game concludes.
4 Properties of Self-enforcing IEAs that Require Costly Monitoring
The subgame perfect equilibrium of the stage game we have just described is either a self-
enforcing agreement under which all members of the agreement abate their emissions, or an 
effective IEA does not form. For an IEA to form, profitable coalitions must exist, which they
will as long as N ≥ scmin; that is, using (9), N ≥ (c+πρ1 f )/b+(c−b)/(bα f (1−ρ1 −ρ2)). 
In the model without costly monitoring of Sect. 2, profitable coalitions always exist because 
we assumed at the outset that N > c/b. However, since c > b and ρ1 +ρ2 < 1, c/b is strictly 
less than (c + πρ1 f )/b + (c − b)/(bα f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)). This implies that while profitable 
coalitions always exist when monitoring is not costly, they may not exist when parties to an 
IEA must fund a monitor to maintain compliance with the agreement. Therefore, we have 
our first conclusion about the impact of costly monitoring on self-enforcing environmental 
agreements:
Proposition 2 The circumstances under which an effective IEA will form are diminished by 
the need for costly compliance monitoring.
That N ≥ (c + πρ1 f )/b + (c − b)/(bα f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)) is required for an effective 
IEA to form is simply a statement about whether international cooperation to limit a global 
pollutant can increase aggregate welfare when we take account of the costs of compliance 
monitoring. Note that (c + πρ1 f )/b + (c − b)/(bα f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)) is decreasing in the 
marginal productivity of monitoring resources, α, and the size of the sanction, f . Decreas-
ing either of these parameters increases the payment cooperators pay to monitor an agree-
ment, leading to a decrease in the set of opportunities for an effective IEA. Note also that 
(c + πρ1 f )/b + (c − b)/(bα f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)) is increasing in the probability the mon-
itor commits either a Type I or Type II error, indicating that the presence of monitoring 
errors further reduces the circumstances under which an effective IEA will form. Finally,
(c + πρ1 f )/b + (c − b)/(bα f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)) is increasing in c and decreasing in b; hence, 
the set of circumstances under which an effective IEA will form is smaller when abatement 
costs are higher and when the individual benefit from abatement is lower.
As with the IEA model without costly monitoring in Sect. 2, a self-enforcing IEA that 
requires costly monitoring is the coalition size that is both internally and externally stable. 
And like the model in Sect. 2, it is easy to demonstrate that the only internally and exter-
nally stable coalition is the smallest profitable coalition given by (9), provided that profitable 
coalitions actually exist. Therefore:
Proposition 3 Let sc be the equilibrium number of members of a self-enforcing agreement
when monitoring for compliance with the agreement is costly. Then,
sc = scmin = min
{
s|s ≥ (c + πρ1 f )/b + (c − b)/(bα f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2))}, (10)
provided that N ≥ scmin. If N < scmin, there are no profitable coalitions and an effective
self-enforcing agreement will not form.
Comparing Proposition 3 to Proposition 1 allows us to determine how costly monitoring
affects the equilibrium number of members of an IEA. When an agreement with costly moni-
toring forms, (10) indicates that the equilibrium size of the coalition sc is the least s for which
s ≥ (c + πρ1 f )/b + (c − b)/(bα f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)). When an IEA does not require costly
monitoring, (5) indicates that the size of the coalition snc is the least s for which s ≥ c/b.
Recall that 1 − ρ1 − ρ2 > 0 is required for an agreement with costly monitoring to form.
Therefore, (c + πρ1 f )/b + (c − b)/(bα f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)) > c/b implies sc ≥ snc, and our
next proposition.
Proposition 4 If an effective IEA that is costly to monitor forms, the number of parties to
the agreement will be no less, and will typically be greater, than if the IEA did not require
costly monitoring.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is straightforward. Since funding the monitor of an
IEA is an additional cost of joining the agreement, more countries are required to participate
and abate their emissions to make the agreement profitable. This produces the seemingly
paradoxical result that costly monitoring of IEAs can produce higher environmental quality.
Generally speaking, participation in an IEA increases with the costs of participation and
decreases with the benefit that participation provides to all the countries. Thus, participation
with an effective IEA that is costly to monitor increases with a country’s abatement cost, c,
and decreases with the individual benefit of some country’s abatement, b. More importantly
for the purposes of this paper, any change in an enforcement parameter that increases the costs
of monitoring will result in greater participation, as long as the IEA remains viable. Thus,
participation and environmental quality increase with decreases in the marginal productiv-
ity of monitoring resources, α, and the sanction for noncompliance, f . Moreover, because
monitoring inaccuracy increases the costs of maintaining compliance with an effective IEA,
participation and environmental quality increase with monitoring inaccuracy as long as this
does not prevent the formation of an IEA.
5 Costly Monitoring of IEAs and Aggregate Welfare
In this section we examine the differences in aggregate welfare under self-enforcing IEAs
that are costly to monitor and under those for which compliance can be enforced without cost.
Costly monitoring produces two countervailing effects on aggregate welfare. The first effect
is the cost of monitoring itself which, holding participation with an IEA constant, dimin-
ishes aggregate welfare. However, costly monitoring can produce greater participation and
higher environmental quality, which increases aggregate welfare. We demonstrate that it is
possible that the latter effect dominates the former so that costly monitoring of international
cooperation actually produces greater aggregate welfare.
Given sc parties to an agreement that each earn w p(sc) − x − πρ1 f = A + bsc − c −
x − πρ1 f , and N − sc free-riding countries that each earn wnp(sc) = A + bsc, aggregate
welfare when cooperation requires costly monitoring is
W c(sc) = sc(A + bsc − c − x − πρ1 f ) + (N − sc)(A + bsc)
= N A + sc(Nb − c − x − πρ1 f ). (11)
Recall that the superscript ‘c’ identifies variables and functions when compliance with an
IEA requires costly monitoring. For convenience, let us assume that sc is continuous. Then,
from (10), sc = (c +πρ1 f )/(b + (c − b)/ /(bα f (1 −ρ1 −ρ2)) as long as it is not greater
than N . Substitute this and x = (c − b)/(α f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)) from (8) into W c(sc) to obtain
W c(sc) = N A +
(
c + πρ1 f
b
+ c − b
bα f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)
)
×
(
Nb − c − c − b
α f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2) − πρ
1 f
)
(12)
Aggregate welfare when a self-enforcing IEA does not require costly monitoring is
W nc(snc) = N A + snc(Nb − c). Allowing snc to be continuous, substitute snc = c/b
from (5) into W nc(snc) to obtain
W nc(snc) = N A + (c/b) (Nb − c) . (13)
Now subtract (13) from (12):
W c(sc) − W nc(snc) =
(
c − b
bα f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2) +
πρ1 f
b
)
×
[
N −
(
2c + πρ1 f
b
+ c − b
bα f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)
)]
.
Since the first term of W c(sc)−W nc(snc) is positive by assumption, the sign of W c(sc)−
Wnc(snc) is equal to the sign of the term in hard brackets, which provides our next proposition.
Proposition 5 Costly monitoring of an IEA results in higher aggregate welfare if and only
if
N >
2c + πρ1 f
b
+ c − b
bα f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2) . (14)
Proposition 5 indicates that costly monitoring of an effective IEA produces higher aggre-
gate welfare when the number of potential parties to the agreement is large enough.
Figure 1 illustrates how W c(sc) and W nc(snc) vary with the number of potential parties 
to an IEA and with the accuracy of compliance monitoring. To draw this graph we have 
assumed, without loss of generality, that A = 0. Aggregate welfare when an IEA does not 
require costly monitoring, W nc(snc), is zero for N ≤ c/b. For  N > c/b, W nc(snc) is positive 
and Eq. (13) indicates that it increases linearly at rate c. The size of a self-enforcing IEA does 
not change as N increases; it remains constant at c/b. However, aggregate welfare increases 
with N because increasing N means we are increasing the number of free-riding countries, 
each of which benefits from the abatement efforts of the c/b parties to the agreement.
The dashed function in Fig. 1 denoted W c(sc|ρ1 = ρ2 = 0) is aggregate welfare for a 
self-enforcing IEA that is costly to monitor and monitoring is perfectly accurate. The dotted 
function, W c(sc|ρ1 + ρ2 > 0), is aggregate welfare for a self-enforcing IEA that is costly to 
monitor and monitoring is inaccurate. Note that W c(sc), with and without monitoring errors, 
is equal to zero for a larger range of N than W nc(snc). This follows because cooperative
cb
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1
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Fig. 1 A comparison of aggregate welfare under self-enforcing international environmental agreements that
require costly monitoring and aggregate welfare under agreements that do not require costly monitoring
abatement efforts that require costly monitoring increase aggregate welfare under a smaller
set of circumstances than when cooperation does not require monitoring (Proposition 2).
If monitoring is perfectly accurate and N ≥ c/b + (c − b)/(bα f ), the coalition sc =
c/b + (c − b)(bα f ) forms and aggregate welfare increases with N at rate c + (c − b)/(α f ).
For N ≥ c/b − (c −b)/(bα f ), the relationship between W c(sc|ρ1 = ρ2 = 0) and W nc(snc)
depends on the positive welfare effect of higher abatement when an IEA must be moni-
tored (because sc > snc from Proposition 4) and the negative welfare effect of the costs
of monitoring. The level of N where W c(sc|ρ1 = ρ2 = 0) and W nc(snc) intersect is
2c/b + (c − b)/(bα f ). Therefore, for N ∈ [c/b + (c − b)/(bα f ), 2c/b + (c − b)/(bα f )),
the monitoring-cost effect dominates the higher-abatement effect so that aggregate welfare
is lower when the equilibrium IEA requires costly monitoring. However, when N exceeds
2c/b + (c − b)/(bα f ) the higher-abatement effect dominates the monitoring-cost effect so
that aggregate welfare is higher when compliance requires costly monitoring.
Monitoring errors further reduce the set of circumstance under which an effective IEA will
form. For a large enough N , it is straightforward to show that W nc(snc) and W c(sc|ρ1+ρ2 >
0) intersect at N = (2c + πρ1 f )/b + (c − b)/(bα f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)). For N greater than this
value, costly and inaccurate monitoring of an IEA leads to higher aggregate welfare than if the
IEA did not require monitoring. Moreover, Eq. (12) indicates that when W c(sc|ρ1 +ρ2 > 0)
is positive it rises more quickly than W c(sc|ρ1 = ρ2 = 0). Therefore, monitoring inac-
curacy results in higher aggregate welfare than under perfectly accurate monitoring if N is
large enough.12 The reason for this counterintuitive result is the now familiar monitoring
cost/abatement tradeoff. Monitoring inaccuracy reduces aggregate welfare because it leads
to higher monitoring costs, but inaccuracy also increases aggregate welfare because it leads
to higher abatement. The latter effect dominates when the number of potential parties to an
IEA is large enough.
12 It is straightforward to show that W c(sc|ρ1 + ρ2 > 0) and W c(sc|ρ1 = ρ2 = 0) intersect at N =
(2c + πρ1 f )/b + (c − b)(2 − ρ1 − ρ2)/(bα f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)).
6 Self-enforcing IEAs with Costly Monitoring and Reputation Effects
Up to this point we have assumed that an enforcement body of an IEA can impose a sanction
on noncompliant members. Given the possibility that a violator may simply refuse to pay a
sanction, which we discussed in Sect. 3, we now examine the consequences of an alternative
model that includes reputation sanctions that cannot be avoided. Modeling costly reputation
effects that result from violating the terms of an IEA forces us to also consider the possibility
that countries that refuse to join an IEA in the first place may also suffer a deterioration
of their reputation as cooperative members of the international community. Therefore, we
now let f denote a sanction that is the value of a member country’s reputation loss when it
violates an IEA, and let g be the value of a country’s reputation loss when it refuses to join
an IEA. Since it is unreasonable to assume that all countries suffer a loss of reputation when
no country joins an IEA, assume that g = 0 when an IEA does not form.13
The noncompliance reputation loss, f , enters our costly monitoring model in the same
way as before. Thus, all changes in our results are due solely to the inclusion of the non-par-
ticipation reputation loss, g. Moreover, as we demonstrate below, the primary effect of this
non-participation sanction is that it can be large enough to induce full participation with an
IEA that does not require costly monitoring. It is only in this case that there are substantive
changes in the results we have obtained thus far. On the other hand, when a model of costless
monitoring and a non-participation sanction predicts less than full participation, all of our
qualitative results about the impacts of costly monitoring on the levels of IEA participation,
environmental quality, and aggregate welfare continue to hold.
We start by revising the welfare functions in (2) to include the non-participation sanction
g. For s ≥ 1, the new welfare functions when compliance with an IEA does not require costly
monitoring are now:
w p(s) = A + bs − c;
wnp(s) = A + bs − g. (15)
As before, w p(0) = wnp(0) = A. Note that
w p(s) − wnp(s − 1) =
{
b + g − c, for s > 1
b − c < 0, for s = 1.
Suppose for now that b + g − c ≥ 0. Then w p(s) ≥ wnp(s − 1) for all s > 1, indicating
that if more than one country joins an IEA, then all other countries will join as well. By
assumption, no country will unilaterally abate its emissions because b − c < 0; however,
since Nb > c, each country is better off if they all form an IEA to abate their emissions than
if none do. Therefore, when the reputation loss from not participating with an IEA is large
enough so that b + g − c ≥ 0, a self-enforcing IEA that does not require costly monitoring
for compliance will involve all countries.
Suppose now that the non-participation loss is not so large; that is, suppose that b+g−c <
0. As with the model of Sect. 2, since b < c, Nb > c, and w p(s) is increasing in s, there
exist coalition sizes that are strictly greater than one and weakly less that N that are profit-
able. Furthermore, using (15) and noting that wnp(0) = A, the smallest of these profitable
13 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that we investigate the impacts on our model of non-par-
ticipation and noncompliance reputation sanctions. We should note that these sanctions need not be reputation 
losses, but could take on other forms. For example, the Montreal Protocol deters non-participation by imposing 
trade restrictions on ozone-depleting chemicals between parties and non-parties. These same trade restrictions 
can also be used to punish noncompliant parties (see Barrett 1998b, p. 36).
coalitions is sncmin = min {s|w p(s) ≥ wnp(0)} = min {s|s ≥ c/b}, which is identical to the
minimum sized profitable coalition in the model of Sect. 2 (see Eq. (3)). Moreover, this is
the only internally and externally stable coalition. Hence, when b + g − c < 0, Proposition 1
continues to hold so that the equilibrium number of members of an IEA that does not require
costly monitoring is snc = min {s|s ≥ c/b}. The only modification to Proposition 1 needed
when non-participation produces a reputation loss is to state that snc = N when b+g−c ≥ 0.
Let us now determine how reputation sanctions affect the self-enforcing number of mem-
bers of an IEA that requires costly compliance monitoring. As detailed in Sect. 3, the game
entails four stages that proceed in exactly the same way, except that now if a member is deter-
mined to be noncompliant, the monitor makes this information public and the violator suffers
a reputation loss, the value of which is f . Despite this re-interpretation of f , it enters the
model exactly as in the model of Sect. 3. Therefore, a party of an IEA complies with its terms
if and only if π f (1−ρ1 −ρ2) ≥ c−b (Eq. (7)), and provided that f (1−ρ1 −ρ2) ≥ (c−b),
each member country must contribute x = (c − b)/(α f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)) to the monitor to
maintain compliance with the agreement (Eq. (8)). Moreover, the minimum size profitable
coalition is the same scmin that is specified in Eq. (9), and profitable coalitions exist if N ≥ scmin.
The main effect of modeling reputation sanctions for both violations and non-participa-
tion is that the non-participation sanction may be large enough to produce full compliance
with an IEA, just as in the model without costly compliance monitoring. From Sect. 3, a
party’s expected welfare from complying with an IEA with s members that requires costly
monitoring is A + bs − c − πρ1 f − x . If instead the country decides not to be a member of
the IEA it suffers the reputation loss of g and earns A + b(s − 1) − g (provided that s > 1).
The IEA obtains full participation if A + bs − c − πρ1 f − x ≥ A + b(s − 1) − g, which
reduces to b + g − c − (πρ1 f + x) ≥ 0. Recall that without the need for costly monitoring,
full participation is realized when b + g − c ≥ 0. Since πρ1 f + x > 0, if the non-partic-
ipation reputation loss is large enough to promote full participation with costly compliance
monitoring, then it is large enough to promote full participation when costly monitoring is
not needed. Therefore, when b + g − c − (πρ1 f + x) ≥ 0, the self-enforcing IEA involves
all countries whether compliance monitoring is costly or not.
However, in all cases in which (b + g) − c − (πρ1 f + x) < 0, the non-participation
loss is not sufficient to induce full compliance with an IEA. Under these circumstances, it
is straightforward to demonstrate that Propositions 2 and 3 of Sect. 4 are unchanged. That
is, costly monitoring limits the circumstance under which an effective IEA forms, but when
one does form its membership is sc, as specified in Eq. (10). However, because the non-
participation reputation loss can produce full participation with an IEA, we must modify
Proposition 4 when this sanction is present. There are two circumstances under which an
effective IEA that requires costly monitoring does not involve higher participation than if it
did not require costly monitoring. One is the case in which the non-participation reputation
loss is so large that an IEA involves full participation whether compliance monitoring is
costly or not. Recall that this is the case when b + g − c − (πρ1 f + x) ≥ 0. The other
case is when b + g − c − (πρ1 f + x)< 0, but b + g − c < 0. In this case, an IEA would
involve full participation if it did not require costly monitoring, but there would be less than
full participation if it does require costly compliance monitoring. When both noncompliance
and non-participation incur reputation losses, costly compliance monitoring of an effective
IEA produces greater participation only when the non-participation reputation loss is low
enough so that b + g − c < 0.
The fact that a loss for not participating with an IEA can produce full participation also
causes us to modify our conclusions in Sect. 5 about the welfare effects of costly monitor-
ing. There we noted that because costly compliance monitoring can increase the number of
participants and environmental quality, it can also produce higher aggregate welfare as well 
because the increase in environmental quality offsets the costs of monitoring under some cir-
cumstances. With both noncompliance and non-participation sanctions, this result continues 
to hold as long as participation is less than complete when costly monitoring is not needed. 
However, when a non-participation sanction is large enough to induce full compliance when 
monitoring is not needed, participation and environmental quality cannot be greater when 
costly monitoring is required. In this case costly monitoring unequivocally reduces aggre-
gate welfare because the costs of monitoring an IEA will never be offset by an increase in 
environmental quality.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have analyzed games of self-enforcing IEAs when parties to such agreements finance 
an independent institution to monitor compliance with the IEA. We have shown that costly 
monitoring limits the circumstances under which international cooperation to control a trans-
boundary pollutant will increase aggregate welfare. However, when an effective IEA does 
form, participation with the agreement and environmental quality can be greater than when 
an IEA does not require costly monitoring. In fact, under some circumstances, costly moni-
toring of an IEA is associated with higher aggregate welfare as well -not for the parties to an 
IEA, however, but for the countries that choose to free ride on the agreement.
Most of our results are robust to the problem of inaccurate monitoring and to different types 
of sanctions. We demonstrate that monitoring inaccuracy can further reduce the set of inter-
national environmental problems that can be addressed with an environmental agreement, but 
when an agreement is worthwhile, monitoring inaccuracy can produce higher participation 
and environmental quality. We also examined two types of sanctions—one that is imposed 
on noncompliant parties by an enforcement body, while the other involves reputation losses 
that are incurred by both noncompliance with an agreement and by not participating with the 
agreement in the first place. The qualitative results of both specifications are the same, except 
when the non-participation loss is so large that it induces full participation with an agreement.
Our results have important implications for multilateral management of environmental 
externalities. Assuming away monitoring and enforcement problems related to IEAs arti-
ficially enlarges the scope of mutually beneficial agreements between countries, and may 
artificially reduce the number of participating countries that are necessary to make these 
agreements worthwhile. In other words, for some international environmental problems, 
monitoring costs either require more members for an IEA to come into effect or they render 
mutual cooperation inefficient.
The models developed in this paper can and should be extended to include additional fea-
tures. An obvious extension would be to recognize the real-world heterogeneity of countries 
involved in international environmental relations. Other features of international cooperation 
such as side payments, issue linkage, and minimum participation requirements that others 
have addressed, can and should be examined in the context of costly monitoring of these 
agreements. Certainly there are many extensions that should be addressed to gain a more 
complete picture of how costly monitoring affects voluntary coalition formation to protect 
the international environment.
Acknowledgements The authors acknowledge funding for this project from the Center for Public Policy 
and Administration, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and the Cooperative State Research Extension, 
Education Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station, and the
Department of Resource Economics under Project No. MAS00871. The authors gratefully acknowledge the
helpful comments of James Murphy, John Spraggon, Erin Baker, and Tim Perri. We would also like to thank
Michael Rauscher and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
References
Arguedas C (2007) To comply or not to comply? Pollution standard setting under costly monitoring and
sanctioning. Forthcoming in Environ Resour Econ
Barrett S (1994) Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements. Oxf Econ Pap 46(1):878–894
Barrett S (1997a) The strategy of trade sanctions in international environmental agreements. Resour Energy
Econ 19(1):345–361. doi:10.1016/S0928-7655(97)00016-X
Barrett S (1997b) Heterogeneous international environmental agreements. In: Carraro Carlo (ed) International
Environmental Negotiations. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA
Barrett S (1998a) On the theory and diplomacy of environmental treaty making. Environ Resour Econ
11(1):317–333. doi:10.1023/A:1008243528330
Barrett S (1998b) Political economy of the Kyoto protocol. Oxf Rev Econ Policy 14(4):20–39. doi:10.1093/
oxrep/14.4.20
Barrett S (2003) Environment and statecraft: the strategy of environmental treaty-making. Oxford University
Press, Oxford and New York
Benedick RE (1998) Ozone diplomacy: new directions in safeguarding the planet, enlarged edition. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA and London, England
Botteon M, Carraro C (1998) Strategies for environmental negotiations: issue linkage with heterogeneous
countries. In: Hanley N, Folmer H (eds) Game Theory and the Environment. Edward Elgar, Chelten-
ham, UK and Northampton, MA
Carraro C, Siniscalco D (1993) Strategies for the international protection of the environment. J Public Econ
52(3):309–328. doi:10.1016/0047-2727(93)90037-T
Carraro C, Botteon M (1997) Burden sharing and coalition stability in environmental negotiations with asym-
metric countries. In: Carraro C (ed) International environmental negotiations. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham,
UK and Northampton, MA
Carraro C, Siniscalco D (1997) R&D Cooperation and the stability of international environmental agree-
ments. In: Carraro C (ed) International environmental negotiations. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and
Northampton, MA, pp 1–2
Carraro C, Siniscalco D (1998) International environmental agreements: incentives and political economy.
Eur Econ Rev 42(3–5):561–572. doi:10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00118-9
Carraro C, Marchiori C, Oreffice S (2003) Endogenous minimum participation in international environmental
treaties. Nota Di Lavaro 113.2003. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper
Chandler P, Tulkens H (1995) A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on trans-
frontier pollution. Int Tax Public Finance 2(2):279–293. doi:10.1007/BF00877502
Chandler P, Tulkens H (1997) The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities. Int J
Game Theory 26(3):379–401
Chayes A, Chayes AH (1991) Compliance without enforcement: state behavior under regulatory treaties.
Negotiation J 7(1):311–330. doi:10.1111/j.1571-9979.1991.tb00625.x
D’Aspremont C, Jacquemin A, Gabszewicz JJ, Weymark JA (1983) On the stability of collusive price leader-
ship. Can J Econ 16(1):17–25. doi:10.2307/134972
Downs GW, Rocke DM, Barsoom PM (1996) Is the good news about compliance good news about coopera-
tion?. Int Organ 50(3):379–340
Finus M (2004) International cooperation to resolve international pollution problems. Fondazione Eni Enrico
Mattei Working Paper
Finus M, Rundshagen B (1998) Toward a positive theory of coalition formation and endogenous instrument
choice in global pollution control. Public Choice 96(1–2):145–186. doi:10.1023/A:1005016623915
Folmer H, van Mouche P, Ragland S (1993) Interconnected games and international environmental problems.
Environ Resour Econ 3(4):313–335. doi:10.1007/BF00418815
Friends of the Earth (2006) Climate treaty one year old, but emissions still rising. Press Release, February 15,
2006 http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/press_releases/climate_treaty_one_year_ol_14022006.html
Heister J, Mohr E, Stahler F, Stoll P-T, Wolfum R (1997) Strategies to enforce compliance with an international
CO2 Treaty. Int Environ Aff 9(1):22–53
Hoel M (1992) International environment conventions: the case of uniform reductions of emissions. Environ
Resour Econ 2(2):141–159
Hoel M, Schneider K (1997) Incentives to participate in an international environmental treaty. Environ Resour
Econ 9(2):153–170
Kaplow L, Shavell S (1994) Accuracy in the determination of liability. J Law Econ 37(1):1–16. doi:10.1086/
467304
Keohane RO (1986) Reciprocity in international relations. Int Organ 40(1):1–27
Kolstad C (2007) Systematic uncertainty in self-enforcing international environmental agreements. J Environ
Econ Manage 53(1):68–79. doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2006.08.001
Macho-Stadler I, Perez-Castrillo D (2006) Optimal enforcement policy and firm’s emissions and compliance
with environmental taxes. J Environ Econ Manage 51(1):110–131. doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2005.06.001
Oberthur S (1998) The International convention for the regulation of whaling: from over-exploitation to total
prohibition. Yearbook of international co-operation on environment and development. Earthscan Pub-
lishers, London
Osmani D, Tol RSJ (2007) Toward farsightedly stable international environmental agreements: part one.
Hamburg University Working Papers, FNU-140
Polinsky AM, Shavell S (2000) The economic theory of public enforcement of law. J Econ Lit 38(1):45–76
Simmons BA (1998) Compliance with international agreements. Annu Rev Polit Sci 1(1):75–93. doi:10.1146/
annurev.polisci.1.1.75
Stranlund JK (2007) The regulatory choice of noncompliance in emissions trading programs. Environ Resour
Econ 38(1):99–117. doi:10.1007/s10640-006-9058-3
Swanson T, Johnston S (1999) Global environmental problems and international environmental agreements:
the economics of international institution building. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton,
MA
Ulph A (2004) Stable international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant, uncertainty and learning.
J Risk Uncertain 29(1):53–73. doi:10.1023/B:RISK.0000031445.13939.e4
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2002) Report on the conference of the parties:
VII session. Part Two: actions taken by the conference of the parties. Marrakesh, January 2002
Wagner UJ (2001) The design of stable international environmental agreements: economic theory and political
economy. J Econ Surv 15(3):377–411. doi:10.1111/1467-6419.00143
